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ARGUMENT

Faux Realism

Spin versus substance in the Bush foreign-policy doctr

By Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik

he Bush administration has coined a f

policy doctrine. President George W. Bush, National Security Advisor Cond

of State Colin Powell herald "the new realism." Think you know what t

in the blank: The "new realism" is . If you find the blank hard to fil

most of today's international-relations scholars. Indeed, one fundamen
administration's new doctrine is that "realism" no

many realists have abandoned their distinctive

realpolitik precepts. International-relations scholars
longer has any real intellectual coherence.
Until recently, realism was a venerable school oftoday are far more inclined to accept that major
thought with a distinct thrust. Realpolitikers such trends-European integration, global trade liberas E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz alization, the surprising power of small countries in
visualized world politics as an anarchic realm inlimited wars such as Vietnam, the impact of human
which the struggle for survival required prudent rights and environmental norms, and the spread of

management of material (generally military) a "democratic peace"-are not shaped simply, or
resources, and where the balance of power ulti-even primarily, by power. Balance-of-power calcumately determined outcomes. Realists chastisedlations are often trumped by imperatives rising
"liberals," "legalists," and "idealists," who believe from economic globalization, political democratithat material and military power are secondary tozation, particular belief systems, and the role of
factors such as the form of domestic governmentinternational law and institutions.
Realists have broadened their definition of
(democratic or authoritarian), the mutual advantages of economic interdependence, the functional"realism" in an attempt to embrace this smorgasbenefits of international institutions, and the swaybord of factors. But the consequence has been conof national and transnational beliefs.
ceptual incoherence. Why does the Bush adminisYet a funny thing happened on the way past thetration associate itself with an academic theory
Cold War. While still attached to the realist label, that no longer seems to mean anything in particular? Aside from the chance that George W. Bush has
Jeffrey W Legro is acting chair and an associate professor
notofbeen keeping up with International Security,
government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.
two broad possibilities stand out:
Andrew Moravcsik is a professor of government and direc-One

is that "realism" gives good spin. The

tor of the European Union Center at Harvard University.
administration employs the term as if its opposite
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were "idealism," "self-delusion," or, as Rice would

huddle around publications like The Weekly Stan-

have it, "romanticism" (as practiced, of course, by

dard and the National Review fearing that the Unit-

the previous administration). The implication is

ed States will find itself militarily unprepared for a

that realism is primarily about seeing and telling the

coming battle for global hegemony with great pow-

hard truth-a conceit common among realists of the

ers such as China and a united Europe.

1930s and 1940s. Peripatetic pessimist Robert

A second and more thoughtful reason the

Kaplan updates this view of a realist theory that can

Bush administration may be attracted to the real-

"grapple with how the world actually works" and
confront the "unrelenting record of uncomfortable

ist label is that the administration does indeed

truths." This tough talk dovetails with Dubya's

wielding military power. While the threat percep-

place a greater emphasis on accumulating and

Any policymaker who relies only on the "realist"
management of military power reveals a greater faith in

simplistic theories than do academics themselves.
own rhetorical style. As the president states, "I'm
tiona of the Bush team is based largely on ideolostraightforward person [and]... represent my coungy, it remains skeptical of strategy and tactics not

closely linked to military dominance. The two
Such realist rhetoric makes for great sound
improbable pillars of the administration's polibites. (The English theorist Herbert Butterfield
cy-national missile defense (NMD) and the Pow-

try's interests in a very straightforward way."

once remarked that realism was more often a boast

ell Doctrine-are linked in this way. Other examthan a philosophy.) But it signifies little. Realism ples include the administration's commitment to
cannot just be a commitment to being "realistic" NATO expansion; departure from the long-standabout the world, pursuing the national interest, ing policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan; iniand being willing to say so. What president has not tial unwillingness to help broker a solution in the
claimed that mantle, even if each perceived reality Middle East; a stated interest in pulling U.S. troops
with a different emphasis?
out of the Balkans; the discounting of the foreign

Properly understood, realism offers clearer public relations effects of stridently self-interested
answers: Reality is material power, and the nation- rhetoric; the slashing of funds to secure Russia's
al interest is to accumulate and balance that power. loose nukes (and loose nuclear scientists); and the
Yet, as was the case with its immediate predecessor, president's declaration that Africa "doesn't fit into
the Bush administration's global threat perception the national strategic interests."

has little to do with power balancing. Where in
Most striking, however, is not the Bush adminW's world are the great powers that could tip the istration's defense of realist tactics per se, but its
global balance: countries like Britain, France, Ger- belief that such tactics foreclose other promising
many, Japan, Indonesia, and India? Among great means of promoting the national interest, among
powers, the administration singles out only China them, democracy promotion, economic integra(with finger waving at Russia), throwing it in the tion, nonmilitary foreign aid, adherence to human
rogues' clubhouse with North Korea, Iraq, Iran, rights, or multilateral cooperation. Consider the
Cuba, Afghanistan, and Libya. These picayune foes quick quashing of a deal, all but reached by South
are targeted not because they are the most power- Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, for a far-reachful-or even minimally powerful-but because they ing d?tente on the Korean peninsula, including

significant restrictions on the North Korean
tile ideologies. This choice of adversaries unites the nuclear program. Unfortunately, such a deal,
current administration and its predecessor against designed to spur a positive evolution in North

are the least democratic and propagate the most hos-

the only remaining pure "realists" in America, who Korea's behavior, fit neither the administration's
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So don't be surprised if the "new realism"
reliance on military deterrence nor its justifistarts to look a bit different this autumn. Newcation for NMD. The administration may

indeed have adhered to a minimalist notion of

born administrations tend to exhibit steep learn-

ing curves as their staffs fill out, they reach
realism, but at a significant potential cost.
If the academic debates between "smorgas- bureaucratic compromises, and practical solubord" realists and their critics have one thing to tions to complex global realities displace simple
teach us, it is that realism's simple solutions tocampaign promises. The Clinton administration
policy dilemmas are misguided. The empirical moved in the opposite direction, pulling back
research that has undermined academic "realfrom some bold international rhetoric. By the
end, it pursued (and this is one of the leading critism" demonstrates that complex, multicausal
icisms Rice and others make of their predecesprocesses underlie most important events. Power
still matters. But countries do not consistentlysors) a highly pragmatic policy. If the Bush
bend to great-power desires, even when backedadministration remains attuned to global reality,
by a credible deterrent; an indirect approach ofit is likely to become more pragmatic as well,
persuasion, negotiation, and, above all, theexpanding tactical options beyond decisive and
encouragement of positive domestic change, areunilateral military action. Bush and company
also potent tools of statecraft. Any policymak-may continue, of course, to label their hybrid
er who relies only on the "realist" managementdoctrine as the "new realism." But outside the
of military power reveals a greater faith in sim- academy, at least, a misleading label is a small
plistic theories than do academics themselves.price to pay for a sensible foreign policy. IM
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